Monday, October 23, 2017
Tuesday, August 22, 2017
Closing arguments in Commission of Inquiry re plot to assassinate Guyana President David Granger
By Selwyn A. Pieters, B.A., LL.B., L.E.C.
Lawyer & Notary Public (Ontario, Canada)
Attorney-at-Law (Republic of Guyana, Island of Trinidad)
Posted on August 21, 2017
Updated November 06, 2017
The Commission of Inquiry to inquire into the persons, places, time, circumstances and events by and through which allegations and reports came to be made of an intention or a plan to assassinate the President of the Co-operative Republic of Guyana has completed it hearing and the Report prepared by Paul E. Slowe was presented to the President of Guyana and made public.
Terms of Reference, Paul Slowe COI
The Commission of Inquiry had 12 sittings and concluded its public hearings on Friday August 18, 2017
Paul Slowe, Sole Commissioner
James A. Bond, was Commission Counsel
Ian N. Chang, S.C. and Brandan Glasford represented the Guyana Police Force
Glenn Hanoman represented Seelall Persaud, D.S.M.
Selwyn Pieters represented Travis Chase
Christopher Ram represented Imran Khan
Commission of Inquiry - Oral and Written Submissions
Written Argument Prepared by Selwyn Pieters on behalf of HGP Nightly News TV. Journalist Travis Chase
Written Argument of Ian N. Chang, S.C. Counsel for the Guyana Police Force submissions at the Paul Slowe COI
Written Reply Submission to Guyana Police Counsel Ian N. Chang Prepared by Selwyn Pieters on behalf of HGP Nightly News TV Journalist Travis Chase
McAteer v. Canada (Attorney General) 2014 CarswellOnt 10955, 2014 ONCA 578, 121 O.R. (3d) 1, 242 A.C.W.S. (3d) 772, 376 D.L.R. (4th) 258 (ONCA)
R. v. Peter Kemble (1990) 1 WLR 1111, [1990] 3 All E.R. 116 (H.L.)
R. v. Nasogaluak, [2010] 1 SCR 206, 2010 SCC 6, 315 DLR (4th) 193; 19 Alta LR (5th) 1; 474 AR 88; 251 CCC (3d) 293; 72 CR (6th) 1; 398 NR 107; AZ-50609170; [2010] CarswellAlta 268; EYB 2010-169818; JE 2010-403; [2010] SCJ No 6 (QL)
R. v. Neil, [2002] 3 SCR 631, 2002 SCC 70, 218 DLR (4th) 671; [2003] 2 WWR 591; 317 AR 73; 6 Alta LR (4th) 1; 168 CCC (3d) 321; 6 CR (6th) 1; 294 NR 201; [2002] CarswellAlta 1301; JE 2002-2002; [2002] SCJ No 72 (QL); 284 WAC 73; 55 WCB (2d) 36
EVIDENCE
David Ramnarine Evidence
Seelall Persaud Evidence
Wendell Blanhum Evidence
Mitchell Caesar Evidence
Andriff Gillard Evidence
Resources / Media
Granger assassination plot inquiry: Lawyers differ over Police Commissioner Persaud’s involvement while on leave Demerara Waves August 18, 2017
CoI Chairman shoots down Blanhum's request to challenge Ramnarine News Room Guyana August 15, 2017
Lawyers clash over bail, Top Cop 'interference' | Guyana Times August 19, 2017
Bail was justified - Guyana Chronicle August 01, 2017
Businessman denies offering GYD$ millions to kill President Granger Demerara Waves August 1, 2017
Assassination plot : Motion to remove Chang as police attorney fails Guyana Chronicle, August 1, 2017
Assassination plot: TV news anchor says cops covering up matter Guyana Chronicle, July 28, 2017
Thursday, August 03, 2017
Cross-examination of Seelall Persaud, the Commissioner of the Guyana Police Force, on note-taking
By Selwyn A. Pieters, B.A., LL.B., L.E.C.
Attorney-at-Law (Republic of Guyana, Island of Trinidad)
Created August 3, 2017
1. inquire into the persons, places, time, circumstances and events by and through which allegations and reports came to be made of an intention or a plan to assassinate the President of the Co-operative Republic of Guyana;
2. investigate and review the full range of the Guyana Police Force’s actions and responses to the reports and the extent to which such actions were conducted or executed with due diligence;
3. determine whether any person and, in particular, officers of the Guyana Police Force had information before and after reports were made of the plan to assassinate the President and whether any such officers communicated that information to a superior authority;
4. record and report on what official action was taken on the basis of the information received and whether there was due diligence by the officers of the Guyana Police Force in the investigation of the plan to assassinate the President;
5. review all actions taken by the Guyana Police Force and examine whether there was evidence failure, neglect or omission to thoroughly and properly investigate the intention or plan to assassinate the President and determine whether such failure or omission was intentional;
6. determine the blameworthiness for failure or neglect of officers or persons involved in the investigation and recommend action to be taken against persons found to be blameworthy;
7. recommend steps that can be taken in order to prevent the recurrence of such incident and can be deemed appropriate by the Commissioner; and
8. identify systemic issues, if any, in the Guyana Police Force’s competence to investigate matters of this nature.
Mr. Pieters: I am Selwyn Pieters I represent the interest of a young reporter Mr. Travis Chase who is also in the Courtroom and I have some questions for you.
Mr. Persaud: Sure.
Mr. Pieters: Now Mr. Commissioner I understand that you were, sworn in as a Police Officer on October 15 1984.
Mr. Persaud: That is correct.
Mr. Pieters: And you are an internationally trained officer as well in terms of experience and education?
Mr. Persaud: That is correct.
Mr. Pieters: And that you went to Harvard University?
Mr. Persaud: That is correct.
Mr. Pieters: What did you do at Harvard University?
Mr. Persaud: A course executive education in National and International Security.
Mr. Pieters: And have you had training as well in other police organisations?
Mr. Persaud:Yes, I did the FBI National Academy at the FBI Academy in Virginia USA, and I did Senior Investigating in Officers Course by the Scottish Police I did several drug investigation course by many conducted by many countries around the world
.......
Mr. Pieters: When did you become aware that Mr. Chase recorded an interview with Mr. Gillard?
Mr. Persaud: I heard about an interview being aired sometime maybe shortly after he
…
Mr. Pieters: When was that?
Mr. Persaud: I can't recall.
Mr. Pieters: Who advised you?
Mr. Persaud: I can't recall either.
....
Mr. Pieters: Yes, I appreciate that, but let me ask you this Mr. Commissioner do you have a pocket book?
Mr. Persaud: No.
Mr. Pieters: How do you record entries of issues that are brought to your attention by Officers?
Mr. Persaud: Its filtered if there is a need to record I do record.
....
Mr. Pieters: Right, well who records, if you don't take a contemporaneous recording which is what your job is as a policeman, you are a policeman regardless if you are a Commissioner or Constable, right?
Mr. Persaud: Yes.
Mr. Pieters: And you are supposed to take contemporaneous notes, aren't you?
Mr. Persaud: On matters that are investigating on matters of interest, yes.
Mr. Pieters: And matters that are brought to your attention in your office as a police officer isn't that the case?
Mr. Persaud: No it's not the case.
.....
Mr. Pieters: Did you take any notes in respect to these matters touching in the assassination plot against the President of the Cooperative Republic of Guyana?
Mr. Persaud: No I didn't.
Mr. Pieters: Why didn't you take notes?
Mr. Persaud: It was not necessary.
Mr. Pieters: I am going to suggest to you that it was.
Mr. Persaud: I am going to continue to say that it was not.
Mr. Pieters: I am going to suggest to you that it was neglect of duty for you not to take notes of an important issues such as this.
Mr. Persaud: I will totally deny that.
Mr. Pieters: Would you said that you know the date when you were advised that Mr. Chase did an interview with Gillard?
Mr. Persaud: No, it was of no interest to me.
Mr. Pieters: It was of no interest to you and we gone get to that.
Mr. Persaud: Yes
...
Mr. Pieters: Let me finish my question, that‟s the problem as a professional
policeman, you testified to the panel that you have no way of making contemporaneous
notes…
Mr. Persaud: That is true unless I find it necessary.
Mr. Pieters: Well let us deal with that.
Mr. Persaud: Yes.
Mr. Pieters: Contemporaneous notes is an aide-memoire... taking notes is an aide-memoire, it aids your memory, and it helps you…
Mr. Persaud:...I don't disagree with you…
....
Mr. Pieters: It is called an aide memoir, but it also assists you when you testify in
court.
Mr. Persaud: But I didn‟t know that it would have been called to testify on this, had I known that then from day one I would have probably made notes.
Mr. Pieters:(inaudible)
Mr. Persaud: No, I make notes when it's necessary, I didn't find it necessary.
Mr. Pieters: But where is your is your memo book?
Mr. Persaud: I have a personal diary.
Mr. Pieters: Where is your personal diary?
Mr. Persaud: It‟s in the office.
Mr. Pieters: You came to court today, you don‟t think you should have brought it?
Mr. Persaud: No.
Mr. Pieters: If that is what you use to recollect your memory.
Mr. Persaud: I am saying that I didn't write anything in relation to this matter in the diary.
Mr. Pieters: You didn't write anything on this matter, so I will suggest this to you didn't write anything on this matter Mr. Persaud because you thought that all the officers would have covered up for you and exclude you from the whole sequence, that I why you didn't make notes.
Mr. Persaud: I totally deny that I don't know of any commissioner of Police that went to any court and gives evidence of any investigation that the police force conducted during his tenure as commissioner.
Mr. Pieters: That is what I suggest to you, and I will make some suggestions to you…
Mr. Pieters: And you ordered that Gillard be sent on bail as well.
Mr. Persaud: I never knew Gillard was arrested.
Mr. Pieters: You did know…
Mr. Persaud: Until this inquiry.
Mr. Pieters: Well that shows how in tune you are with the police force that you
manage.
....
Mr. Pieters: And when would you have briefed Mr. Ramnarine prior to your leave
in…I think it was the end of February you went on leave.
Mr. Persaud: It is normally done in the week before I proceeded.
Mr. Pieters: Would you have memoed him?
Mr. Persaud: Well no, there were oral briefs.
Mr. Pieters: They were oral briefs, there was no note taker taking notes?
Mr. Persaud: No.
Mr. Pieters: And were you taking notes during the meeting with what you said to
Ramnarine?
Mr. Persaud: No.
Mr. Pieters: And is Ramnarine taking notes of what you are saying to him?
Mr. Persaud: I don‟t know.
Mr. Pieters: Well you were at the meeting tell the panel.
Mr. Persaud: I did see him writing I don‟t know if he was taking notes or writing
something else, I never review.
Mr. Pieters: So the change over of command is quite an ad-hoc matter…
Thursday, July 27, 2017
Sunday, July 02, 2017
Monday, June 26, 2017
BADC Closing Arguments - Andrew Loku Inquest (notes)
By Selwyn A. Pieters, B.A., LL.B., L.E.C.
Lawyer & Notary Public (Ontario, Canada)
Attorney-at-Law (Republic of Guyana, Island of Trinidad)
Created June 26, 2017
I want to thank you, members of the jury for taking the time to be here for a case that is of great importance to our communities and taking time out of your lives to be the jury in this case.
Sir Robert Peel stated that "The police are the public and the public are the police." So that if we break this down in a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, and multi-racial society it means that the police must have experientially interacted with citizens including Black men and women and persons with mental health exceptionalities."
Sir Robert Peel stated that "The police are the public and the public are the police." So that if we break this down in a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, and multi-racial society it means that the police must have experientially interacted with citizens including Black men and women and persons with mental health exceptionalities."
"One of the Black Action Defence Committee (BADC) Directors reminded me at lunch today that we are on one ship so that if we sink you will too.
The Relationship between police and black community must be look at holistically. If relationship continues to be strained and steps aren’t taken to ameliorate that relationship, no one is safe in this city. Black lives matter. Our lives matters.
Constable Doyle testified that he had a Black partner but never had experience interacting with Black men. You heard the evidence of Professor Nicholas Rule where he spoke of the implicit bias and the shift of perception of Black men from "happy go lucky to Black men to being stereotyped as being angry and aggressive."
Implicit bias affects all of us. 35% of all fatal shootings, at least, are black men. This has led to a fear of the police in our communities. So our fear of police is not irrational. There is disparity in policing and how we are policed. That goes to recommendation with respect to compiling of statistics. We want official statistics. We want use of Force form to be amended to document race of person, and mental health issues. Race, gender, ethnicity of anyone killed or seriously hurt. Dr. Rule spoke of being collect and analyze data on implicit bias of individual officers from recruitment to advancement through the service. He also speak of tracking this data on a systemic level. Dr. Kwame McKenzie also spoke of the important of statistics in respect to the institutional racism including the use of force. So for both experts the collection of statistics are important.
We all worked collaboratively to come up with slate. Also join recommendations of Across Boundaries, that speak about intersectionality of mental health and anti-black racism. Some people would want you to believe that racism has nothing to do with this case. Race and mental health is at the core of what this case is about. We are not taking colour blind approach to this case. Race has something to do with it. That’s why this room was filled when Constable Doyle testified. Our community wanted to hear from him. W e are disappointed that the officers said they wouldn’t change anything they did in that same situation.
We have had inquests before where jury recommended tasers. You have seen the evidence that each Toronto Police officer has a gun, three magazines of ammo (15 rounds each). We're arming them for war, not peace.
You job is very important and I echo what Mr. Morton said, it is the most important thing you will do to make recommendations to governments, agencies and the police sop that lives are saved, deaths are prevented.
See also Dr. Carlise ruling on racism
See also Dr. Carlise ruling on racism
Sunday, June 25, 2017
Monday, June 12, 2017
Cross-examination of Nicholas Rule on Racial Bias in Judgments of Physical Size and Formidability
By Selwyn A. Pieters, B.A., LL.B., L.E.C.
Attorney-at-Law (Republic of Guyana, Island of Trinidad)
Created June 12, 2017
On June 12, 2017, at the Andrew Loku Inquest I crossed examined Professor Nicholas Rule on an article he coauthored: Wilson, J. P., Hugenberg, K., & Rule, N. O Racial Bias in Judgments of Physical Size and Formidability: From Size to Threat. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology.Advance online publication. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000092
--- E x T R A C T ---
NICHOLAS
RULE
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SELWYN PIETERS:
Q. Good afternoon, Dr. Rule.
A. Good afternoon.
Q. I am Selwyn Pieters. I represent the Black Action Defence
Committee. Now, you spoke about implicit
bias as perceiving or having Black men stereotyped as angry and aggressive.
A. I did. Yes.
Q. And you spoke about the shift of Black men
being happy go lucky or Black people being perceived as happy-go-lucky people.
A. That’s right.
Q. Right.
This angry and aggressive posture that comes from implicit bias, would
you say that that is something that infects society as a whole?
A. It certainly affects
society as a whole, yes.
Q. Then so if that is the case, then the fear of
a Black man is based on implicit thought processes rather than objective fear,
would you agree?
A. I would agree.
Q. You mentioned a shopping mall example with respect
to a wallet and a gun. You recall that?
A. I do.
Q. And you mentioned that it is likely that the
perception would be the Black person having the gun?
A. That’s what the studies
have shown, yes.
Q. Right.
So, if that situation is replicated in real life in a shopping mall
where a White man has a gun and the Black man has the wallet, would it be the case,
taking what you said or say -- the association of black with crime is and
implicit association of Black people with crime -- that the Black person would
be at risk of violence from the police or a negative reaction?
A. You mean as opposed to
the White person --
Q. Yes.
A. -- with the gun? I don’t know that it would necessarily go
that far, actually. So I think that it
would be more likely that the presence of an actual gun would be a more salient
stimulus to draw attention. So I -- it
is -- the studies do show that people are more likely to mistake the wallet for
a gun in the hands of Black person and that they’re then faster to make a shoot
decision, but it doesn’t necessarily mean that they would mistake a gun for a
wallet per se in the case of a White person.
Q. Very well. You’re familiar with the Diallo situation in
the U.S. where a Black man was shot taking a wallet out of his pocket?
A. I am.
Q. Very well.
You mentioned, you spoke about implicit bias and then you spoke about
implicit racism.
A. That’s right.
Q. Define implicit racism for us.
A. Implicit racism would
be beliefs about a group defined by its race that are held implicitly and are
of negative valence against that group.
Q. Very well. Now ---
A. If I can -- I would say
implicit racism is a specific type of implicit bias.
Q. But it’s racism nonetheless?
A. That’s right. Yes.
Q. Right.
Would you say it’s possible for Toronto Police to compile social science
data on implicit bias in relation to individual officers from the time they
join the force and as they progress through the force?
A. It is certainly possible
for us to measure implicit associations held by a particular individual and to
track those for changes over time.
Q. What about systemically within the
organization?
A. Within the organization
you would need to make those individual assessments and then you could perhaps
aggregate them to say that, you know, a given group of individuals is more
prone towards a particular level of bias. Though, I don’t know that that would necessarily
constitute the same idea as an institutionally endorsed or a reiterated notion.
Q. I’m going to put some propositions to you and
you can tell me whether you agree or whether you disagree or you can explain
it.
A. Sure.
Q. I’m going to suggest to that the perpetuation
or the perpetration of implicit bias is a form of violence based on what you
described today in respect to how Black men are perceived and treated.
A. It would depend on the
way that one defines violence. If one
defines violence as a physical behaviour then I would not agree. If one defines violence as, you know, including
aggressive thoughts, that might be possible.
However, I might still disagree, actually, because I think in that case
they would need to be conscious thoughts for them to be considered violent.
Q. Yes. But
if someone has implicit thoughts of violence against someone, are you saying that
that would be excused?
A. No. I don’t think that one would necessarily have
implicit thoughts of violence. So, the
nature of the way that, you know, a human would think about violence or
particular actions wouldn’t necessarily be at an implicit level. Those would have to occur somewhat more
explicitly. The implicit level would simply
be the associations between two concepts, so it’s a -- it’s a much more basic
thing. But to actually consider a
violent act, or any behaviour of that sort, would require a -- an either
explicit or semi-explicit level, I think.
Q. I take it from your testimony, you can agree,
disagree or explain it, that this implicit bias that you spoke about and that
you researched and wrote about, it perpetrates oppression against a specific
race and that’s Black people.
A. I think I could agree
with that.
Q. I also take it from your study and what you
said today that the relationship between discrimination on the basis -- there
is a relationship between discrimination on the basis of race and implicit bias?
A. There is and that would
be implicit racism.
Q. And that there is a relationship between
prejudice, stereotyping, discrimination and implicit bias?
A. There certainly is,
yes.
Q. And that discriminatory attitudes and implicit
bias are mutually exclusive? Or they go
-- sorry, not mutually exclusive. They
go hand in hand?
A. Yes. But not in a bidirectional manner. So, as I said earlier, implicit bias would be
present when there are discriminatory attitudes, but implicit bias can be
present without discriminatory attitudes as well.
Q. You said something here and I’m going to put
something to you and you can tell me what your position is. You said we favour people who look like us in
very important ways.
A. That’s right.
Q. So, I’m going to put this to you: Colour
blindness and excuses are the means by which the dominant group maintains its
position. I can put it differently.
THE CORONER: Perhaps if
you did rephrase it might be easier for the witness.
BY MR. PIETERS:
Q. If what you said today in evidence is true
and this implicit bias has its most virulent or its most devastating impact on
Black people, let’s say in Canada or in Toronto, then we can’t really boil down
implicit bias or any of these things in a colour-blind way.
A. Well, what I can say
about colour blindness is that it’s typically regarded as an ineffective
strategy for dealing with race relations.
Colour blindness typically -- so the idea of colour blindness is the
notion that if we ignore differences between groups -- in this case racial
groups, groups defined by colour differences, typically -- that there won’t be
problems. That if we just, you know, if
we don’t see the differences then there aren’t issues to discuss. The data have clearly shown that that is not
effective but rather it masks the underlying issues. But rather an approach that acknowledges
differences and discusses those differences is more effective for ameliorating
any discrepancies that are based on those differences.
THE CORONER: Mr. Pieters,
a time warning. You have two minutes.
MR. PIETERS: Very
well. I’m going to finish way before
then, Dr. Carlisle.
THE CORONER: Anything you
can do to help.
BY MR. PIETERS:
Q. What effect does denial from a systemic level,
for example, a president of a police association denying that police act on implicit
biases, have on managing that association or managing its members in dealing
with issues of implicit bias or racism?
A. I think that that would
likely be problematic. I think any time that
-- if we’re truly discussing denial as a concept whereby one knows one thing
but does not wish to accept it, as denial is often used in the psychological
literature, then that wouldn’t be -- that is not a productive step towards
making any kind of change. It’s
important that one acknowledges a phenomenon before one can potentially even
deal with.
Q. What would be your recommendation to the jury
for a police service to confront this issue and deal with it?
A. That’s a very big
question. I think that, you know, if
there are differences in the way that suspects are being treating on the basis
of their race, then certainly an examination is required to understand why this
is occurring, how it’s occurring and then steps would need to be taken. If it’s determined that this is based on implicit
biases, that is associations or expectations that people from one racial group are
more prone to criminal behaviour than another, then some of the training
exercises that we discussed earlier today might be appropriate for attempting
to correct those biases.
Q. Than you, Dr. Carlisle. Thank you, Dr. Rule.
A. Thank you.
THE CORONER: Thank you,
Mr. Pieters.
See also, Wendy Gillis, Black men perceived as more threatening, expert tells Andrew Loku inquest, Toronto Star, June 12, 2017
Sunday, June 11, 2017
Implicit bias, anti-Black racism and police use of force in Toronto, Ont...
Implicit Bias and Race:
Implicit bias is widely accepted as affecting nearly every criminal justice context.
Implicit bias in policing affects
the ability to detect threats
with Black suspects, the decision to use force, and ultimately, the approach
to the Use of Force Model. For example, Black suspects
are viewed as larger, more physically imposing threats, with or without a weapon.
Racial profiling is both an act and a title. People notice what race we are on an everyday basis.
Some individual Police
Officer act on their personal biases.
That has always been the case. However,
given that racial bias is largely implicit, i.e. officers are unaware
that race plays a role in their interaction with Black suspects, the discussion of implicit bias needs to be progressive. Implicit bias is hard to detect because officers are unable to
have any introspection into how race plays into their decision-making. This is especially prevalent for officers
who genuinely hold the position that race was not a factor in their decision to
use force. Bias-free policing looks at behaviour, rather than appearance, to come to strategic decisions.
If race even only plays a factor amongst many factors in the decision to act or refrain from acting, the manner in which Black suspects are treated can be dramatically different than the way White
suspects are treated in similar situations. In other words, race does not have to be the cause for the interaction with a suspect,
however, when race factors into the decision on how to approach a conflict, the results can be
disastrous. Racism Behaviour is not a social issue that simply disappears over time; it requires a myriad of active decisions to raise awareness of implicit bias and extensive training. Implicit bias has an inexorable link to the decision to use force.
One of the primary
decisions that must be made in use of force is the decision to de-escalate, even in the face of a threat. In the following section I outline the legitimate considerations that
are involved in threat
assessments and the decision to use force.
Race will never be
a legitimate consideration.
This is not to say that the officers
involved are necessarily racist or have any malicious or malevolent racist impulses; but the officers,
under the pressure
that comes with the
job as an officer, may have what has been termed a "shooter bias."
Shooter bias research suggests that there is a bias for white people to shoot Black suspects more often than White suspects. This is predominantly rooted in the belief that Black suspects, armed or unarmed,
are more volatile and dangerous. If the officer has the
implicit bias that there is a greater danger posed by a Black suspect, they feel justified in using a corresponding response
according to the Use of Force model.
I will discuss the considerations that go into the decision to use force,
including when force can be used, the types of force that can be used, the use of force continuum,
the factors to determine
whether the use of force
was excessive or not, and the broad and flexible powers of de-escalation. One must never forget
that "Hormonal Induced Stress" often affects police
officers in deadly force encounters.
.
Sunday, June 04, 2017
Black Action Defense Committee Granted Standing in Andrew Loku Inquest
The Black Action Defense Committee will be representing
the Black Community’s Interest at the Inquest into the Police Shooting Death of
Andrew Loku on July 7, 2015. The Inquest opens tomorrow, Monday June 5th
at the Coroner’s Court at 25 Morton Shulman Ave. Toronto, Ontario M3M 0B1.
BADC will be represented by Civil Rights Lawyer Selwyn A. Pieters, B.A., LL.B., L.E.C.
Lawyer & Notary Public
Lawyer & Notary Public
The following points are of Particular
Interest to BADC:
1. Andrew Loku’s killing by the police in less than 90 seconds of arriving on the scene is very troubling and The Black Action Defense Committee is interested in exploring this Issue more fully at the Inquest.
2. The current police methods and practice in responding to crisis calls, by deploying police with lethal weapons and the use of lethal weapons as the initial intervention strategy when it is well known that Police officers give commands and that distraught or angry people react very negatively to force and commands is of grave concern to BADC.
3.
BADC wants change to the
Paradigm in how crisis calls are viewed by the police to reflect a human
service crisis intervention model in which human service professionals with
appropriate behavior management and Crisis intervention skills are first
deployed to defuse the situation.
(As a mental health professional I have been involved in defusing
crises by utilizing human relations and human service/ behavior management
responding skills to, successfully deescalate crisis situations for
Decades.)
4.
Since many of these situations
end up in the police killing the agitated individual, we propose that prior to
police intervention, a skilled human service professional with crisis
management and behavior management skills be deployed; to do the intervention
and only if, and when, that person advises the police that the situation cannot
be resolved without their direct intervention should the police approach
distressed people.
5.
For this to work, Police
Services would need to hire a significant pool of human service trained professionals
in order to have them deployed as first responders in such situations.
6.
Alternatively, we recommend the
creation of another agency that will first deploy when 911 calls indicate
someone in crisis. Those professionals would be able to defuse the situation
and assess whether further professional assistance is required by the
individuals and engage the appropriate type of services for the individuals in
question. (Not necessarily the traditional trip to the Psychiatric Hospital.)
7.
Another area of interest of
BADC, is exploring what a rational standard ought to be, for officers to use to
determine when their safety or life is in danger. This cannot be left up to
individual officers judgment, without guidance because not all fears are
rational and if the standard remains alleged fear by the office, without any
objective criteria for assessment of the risk, then innocent people that pose
no harm will continue to die at the hands of police.
BADC believe that the reasonable person’s
test should be applied to this situation to develop a set of standards to be
used by police and other first responders.
Background:
The Black Action Defense Committee was
established after the Police Killing of Lester Donaldson in 1988. Mr. Donaldson
was a Black Man with mental health problems. He had been the subject of
extensive police harassment and a prior police shooting which left him
disabled.
BADC sought standing at his inquest to
determine what if any role race played in his shooting but standing was denied
on the basis that there was no evidence that race was a factor despite several
Affidavits to the contrary. See case below re litigation and appeal of the
Coroners decision.
Black Action Defence Committee v. Huxter,
Coroner, 11 OR (3d) 641; [1992] OJ No 2741 (QL); 59 OAC 327 (ON SC),
<http://canlii.ca/t/g1524>
Since Lester Donaldson’s death, several
other Black men have similarly been killed by the police and numerous inquests
have been held which attempt to explore how race and mental health issues are
addressed by the police and why lethal force is usually deployed when these two
characteristics, being Black with mental health issues intersect.
For further information,
Contact: Kingsley Gilliam 647-267-1774
Valarie
Steele 416-656-4624
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