Walter Rodney Commission of Inquiry - Gerald "Gerry" Gouveia evidence - Does a Reasonable apprehension of bias exist?

"We are trying to get to the truth of this matter and every single document that exists and should exist, should be here that is what my point is." Selwyn A. Pieters


By Selwyn A. Pieters, B.A., LL.B., L.E.C.
Lawyer & Notary Public (Ontario, Canada)
Attorney-at-Law (Republic of Guyana, Island of Trinidad)
Posted on June 26, 2014
Updated on July 1, 2014

As a lawyer with significant experience in human rights, civil rights and non-adversarial matters, I was retained to represent its interest of the Guyana Trades Union Congress (GTUC) at the Walter Rodney Commission of Inquiry. I am currently co-counsel with Brian M. Clarke representing the Guyana Trades Union Congress in the Walter Anthony Rodney Commission of Inquiry in Georgetown, Guyana.

Gerald "Gerry" Gouveia provided evidence at the Commission of Inquiry on June 26, 2014 and June 27, 2014. He is one of the singularly most important witness in this inquiry (outside of Donald Rodney, who was present with Dr. Walter Rodney when he met his demise) as Gouveia is alleged to be the pilot who flew William Gregory Smith out of Georgetown after the "terrible accident" that
resulted in the death of Walter Anthony Rodney. And the evidence of his flight log and witness
statements appears to be powerful objective evidence that he flew an aircraft from Timerhi to Kwakwani.

The Commissioners are Sir. Richard L. Cheltenham, K.A., Q.C., Ph.D – Chairman (Barbados); Mrs. Jacqueline Samuels-Brown, Q.C. (Jamaica) and Mr. Seenath Jairam, S.C. (Trinidad). The Commission’s mandate established by its terms of reference includes the following:-
(i) To examine the facts and circumstances immediately prior, at the time of, and subsequent to, the death of Dr. Walter Rodney in order to determine, as far as possible, who or what was responsible for the explosion resulting in the death of Dr. Walter Rodney;
(ii) To inquire into the cause of the explosion in which Dr. Walter Rodney died, whether it was an act of terrorism, and if so, who were the perpetrators;
(iii) To specifically examine the role, if any, which the late Gregory Smith, Sergeant of the Guyana Defence Force, played in the death of Dr. Walter Rodney and if so, to inquire into who may have counselled, procured, aided and or abetted him to do so, including facilitating his departure from Guyana after Dr. Walter Rodney’s death...

Gerald "Gerry" Gouveia evidence goes primarily to i) to iii) of the Terms of Reference.:

Gouveia testifed to the effect that "When I saw the picture of the person.. there was an anomoly in my mind....

"At that moment in time, and I remember this as an anomoly, I remember the picture of the man and I felt that the man that I am looking at in that picture.... looked like the man on my aircraft… but I never knew for sure…

"I really cannot say with 100 percent certainty but there was an anomaly in my mind.”

This testimony tiggered an aggressive cross-examination style intervention by Commission Chairman, Sir Richard Cheltenham of the witness even though his lawyer, Dave Kissoon, had not even completed his examination in chief.

Sir. Richard L. Cheltenham, was unrestrained in his aggressive cross-examination of the witness, even though the witness examination in Chief was not completed, nor was an opportunity provided to Commission Counsel or any other counsel for that matter to complete their cross-examinations before the Chairman conducted himself as he did.

I have listened to the evidence via livesteam on NCN and benefitted from Stabroek News posting the entirety of the video recordings online. The full transcripts of the evidence of Gerald Richard Gouveia is also available for June 26, 2014 and June 27, 2014. Here are some examples of what took place at the hearing:


Sir Richard Cheltenham "Whether given an anomoly was triggered ... did you take any steps to ascertain whether it was Gregory Smith"

Sir Richard Cheltenham "Did it appear to you that you may have provided for his escape... acting on the orders of superiors"

"Was it the duty of the military to provide escape for a killer" Commission Chairman, Sir Richard Cheltenham asked. "Absolutely not" Gerry Gouveia answered 54 minutes into the video recording Walter Rodney COI, June 26, 2014 - Part 1, Stabroek News, June 26, 2014

"But that must have occurred to you given what you were hearing reported in the media" Commission Chairman, Sir Richard Cheltenham  persisted.

Having read the media reports Commission Chairman, Sir Richard Cheltenham pressed on that this man Gregory Smith that was fingered in the media and Gouveia having seen the picture in the newspaper noted that "that is the very man I took. The implication of that is if that report is true that you would have provided escape, on instructions, for a killer."

Gouveia was asked by Sir Richard Cheltenham whether he reported the matter to a superior officer. He said no.

Commission Chairman, Sir Richard Cheltenham then asked 56 - 57 minutes into the recording:

Did it burden your conscience? NO
Did it troubled you at all? NO
Why not? In the context of a military officer over the years I have been involved in many operations...

Commission Chairman, Sir Richard Cheltenham in response to the above answers went on to ask "Were you involved in providing escape for a criminal or killers - were you involved in that kind of thing before" Absolutely not Gerry Gouveia answered.

Commission Chairman, Sir Richard Cheltenham asked "Were you indifferent to whether or not that you were involved in transporting the man that killed Rodney" Commission Chairman, Sir Richard Cheltenham "No Sir" Gerry Gouveia answered.

On June 27, 2014, Counsel to the Commission, Mr. Glenn Hanoman covered much the same terrain:

Mr. Hanoman: Mr. Gouveia, you are aware today that if for instance, you were to harbor or assist a murder accused to escape justice; that you can be charged as an accessory after the fact?
Mr. Gouveia: I imagine the Law would do that, yes.
Mr. Hanoman: As a matter of fact, you know that you could also be charged for murder?
Mr. Gouveia: No, I do not know that, Sir.
Mr. Hanoman: If you assist a murder accused to get away, you know that you could be charged for murder?
Mr. Gouveia: No, I do not know the Law like that, but I am sure my Lawyer would advise me.
Mr. Hanoman: Now, let me suggest to you that the reason you never shared this information with anybody about your held belief that you had transported this person who was accused of murder, the reason you never shared it with anybody is because you were afraid that you too would be charged for murder or for being an accessory after the fact?
Mr. Gouveia: No, Sir.....

Mr. Hanoman: Do you agree that someone trying to escape criminality would have a greater motivation to put a false entry into a logbook, than somebody who is just keeping a record of the aerodrome? Do you agree?
Captain Gouveia: Could you repeat the question, Sir.
Mr. Hanoman: A man who is accused of flying a murder accused away from a scene, has a greater motivation to put a false entry into a log than somebody who mundanely records aircrafts as they come and go?
Captain Gouveia: I have never altered the aircraft logbook, here, and my times and so. I would have to say to you that if your analogy is based on a fairy-tale, yes, but I flew this plane according to this logbook and the records were not altered. I know I am not permitted to ask a question, Sir. I came here, I said to you that I believe the man Gregory Smith was on the plane, I believe on the 14th. If I flew him on the 17th, I would be the first one to stand here and tell you that. You do not need to dig like this. I would tell you I did because if I flew him on the 14th and I flew him on the 17th, it is exactly the same thing. I did not fly him on the 17th. I would have been proud to tell you that, but I did not fly him on the 17th.

****

In correspondence to the Commission's Secretariat dated May 30, 2014, I requested the Commission ask the Guyana Defence Force to produced ducuments including the following:

9.      In respect to the Guyana Defence Force plane that allegedly took Gregory Smith to Kwakwani and outside of Guyana, please ask the Guyana Defence Force to produce its records for its aircrafts and helicoptors for June 15 – 17, 1980.
10.  Any official Immigration Records for Gregory Smith for June 17, 1980.
11.  Any official records from the Civil Aviation Authorities in Guyana including record of departure and passport used, whether false or genuine.

Captain Gouveia's evidence concluded today without the benefit of any relevant documents from the Guyana Defence Force being produced to the Commission. This is the third such witness that appeared and documents that are relevant to the TORs, were not readily available by the record holder. See my discussion with the Commission on June 06, 2014 on this subject matter: Walter Rodney Commission of Inquiry - The Battle for Contemporaneous Documents.

*****

Back to the bias issue, the question is whether or not the questions as they were asked by Commission Chairman, Sir Richard Cheltenham of the witness was to “clear up a point that has been overlooked or left obscure” Jones v. National Coal Board, [1957] 2 All E.R. 155,  [1957] 2 K.B. 55 (C.A.). Alternatively, can it be said that where a Commissioner interrupts during examination in chief and takes the lead in questioning the witnesses in an adversarial manner on matters that goes to the heart of its terms of reference, a reasonable person can be led to conclude a reasonable apprehension of bias? See, Chrétien v. Canada (Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program and Advertising Activities, Gomery Commission) [2008] F.C.J. No. 973, 2008 FC 802, 168 A.C.W.S. (3d) 681. In the further alternative, given that there was no serious objections from counsel for Mr. Gouveia who was present at the hearing, can this be accepted as part of the special nature of a Commission of Inquiry?

At the end of the proceedings Commission Chairman, Sir Richard Cheltenham indicated that Gerald Gouveia is here "to talk about his role in transporting Gregory Smith  the day after Rodney was assassinated." See, Walter Rodney COI, June 26, 2014 - Part 4 at 51:54 minutes. Again, this is an interesting comment in the context of how one assesses the role of the Commission and Chairperson and the permissible degree of pronouncements prior to hearing all of the evidence and completing its report.

THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE WITH SUCH ISSUES - GOMERY COMMISSION

In Chrétien v. Canada (Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program and Advertising Activities, Gomery Commission) [2008] F.C.J. No. 973, 2008 FC 802, 168 A.C.W.S. (3d) 681, Justice Teitelbaum considered the comments of Commissioner Gomery whist the Prime Minister was a witness before the Commission of Inquiry and ultimately concluded that a reasonable apprehension of bias exist. In coming to that conclusion he set out the law that guided him as follows:

Issue 3: Did the Commissioner breach the duty of procedural fairness?

                    A. Was there a reasonable apprehension of bias on the Commissioner's part toward the Applicant?

67     Procedural fairness requires that decisions be made free from a reasonable apprehension of bias by an impartial decision-maker (Baker, supra, at para. 45). The standard of impartiality expected of a decision-maker is variable depending on the role and function of the decision-maker involved (Newfoundland Telephone Co. v. Newfoundland (Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 623 per Cory J. [hereinafter Newfoundland Telephone]. In Newfoundland Telephone, the Supreme Court established a spectrum for assessing allegations of bias against members of commissions or administrative boards:

                    It can be seen that there is a great diversity of administrative boards. Those that are primarily adjudicative in their functions will be expected to comply with the standard applicable to courts. That is to say that the conduct of the members of the Board should be such that there could be no reasonable apprehension of bias with regard to their decision. At the other end of the scale are boards with popularly elected members such as those dealing with planning and development whose members are municipal councillors. With those boards, the standard will be much more lenient. In order to disqualify the members a challenging party must establish that there has been a pre-judgment of the matter to such an extent that any representations to the contrary would be futile. Administrative boards that deal with matters of policy will be closely comparable to the boards composed of municipal councillors. For those boards, a strict application of a reasonable apprehension of bias as a test might undermine the very role which has been entrusted to them by the legislature.

                    [...]

                    Further, a member of a board which performs a policy formation function should not be susceptible to a charge of bias simply because of the expression of strong opinions prior to the hearing. This does not of course mean that there are no limits to the conduct of board members. It is simply a confirmation of the principle that the courts must take a flexible approach to the problem so that the standard which is applied varies with the role and function of the Board which is being considered. In the end, however, commissioners must base their decision on the evidence which is before them. Although they may draw upon their relevant expertise and their background of knowledge and understanding, this must be applied to the evidence which has been adduced before the board: Newfoundland Telephone Co., supra, at pp. 638-639.

68     Justice Cory stressed in that case "that the courts must take a flexible approach to the problem so that the standard which is applied varies with the role and function of the Board which is being considered" (Newfoundland Telephone, supra, at p. 639). Applying this flexible approach, he then concluded that the applicable standard for assessing the Board's impartiality during the investigative stage was the closed-mind standard. He also found that when the matter reached the hearing stage, the Board's role had changed and, as a result, the standard used to assess the Board's conduct at that stage was the reasonable apprehension of bias standard.

69     In Beno (FCA), supra, the Federal Court of Appeal considered the nature, mandate and function of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia and determined that the Commission was situated somewhere between the legislative and adjudicative extremes on the spectrum, stating the following at paragraphs 26-27:

                    It is not necessary, for the purposes of this appeal, to determine with precision the test of impartiality that is applicable to members of commissions of inquiry. Depending on its nature, mandate and function, the Somalia Inquiry must be situated along the Newfoundland Telephone spectrum somewhere between its legislative and adjudicative extremes. Because of the significant differences between this Inquiry and a civil or criminal proceeding, the adjudicative extreme would be inappropriate in this case. On the other hand, in view of the serious consequences that the report of a commission may have for those who have been served with a section 13 notice, the permissive "closed mind" standard at the legislative extreme would also be inappropriate. We are of the opinion that the Commissioners of the Somalia Inquiry must perform their duties in a way which, having regard to the special nature of their functions, does not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. As in Newfoundland Telephone, the reasonable apprehension of bias standard must be applied flexibly. Cory J. held (supra, at pages 644-645):

                    Once matters proceeded to a hearing, a higher standard had to be applied. Procedural fairness then required the board members to conduct themselves so that there could be no reasonable apprehension of bias. The application of that test must be flexible. It need not be as strict for this Board dealing with policy matters as it would be for a board acting solely in an adjudicative capacity. This standard of conduct will not of course inhibit the most vigorous questioning of witnesses and counsel by board members.

                    Applying that test, we cannot but disagree with the findings of the Judge of first instance. A commissioner should be disqualified for bias only if the challenger establishes a reasonable apprehension that the commissioner would reach a conclusion on a basis other than the evidence. In this case, a flexible application of the reasonable apprehension of bias test requires that the reviewing court take into consideration the fact that the commissioners were acting as investigators in the context of a long, arduous and complex inquiry. The Judge failed to appreciate this context in applying the test.

70     Relying on the Federal Court of Appeal's decision in Beno, the Attorney General submits that the Commission falls in the middle of the Newfoundland Telephone spectrum and argues that the applicable test is whether there is a reasonable apprehension that the Commissioner would reach a conclusion on a basis other than the evidence. In the alternative, the Attorney General submits that the applicable test is the reasonable apprehension of bias test established in Committee for Justice and Liberty v. National Energy Board, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369 [hereinafter Committee for Justice and Liberty].

71     The Applicant submits that the test for assessing Commissioner Gomery's impartiality is the reasonable apprehension of bias test or reasonable person test as enunciated in the dissenting judgment of Justice de Grandpré in Committee for Justice and Liberty and subsequently adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada. The Applicant argues that since the Commissioner is a judge and was appointed as Commissioner because of his judicial skills, the applicable test for determining whether or not there is a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the Commissioner is the same as that which is applied when assessing the impartiality of a judge presiding over a trial. Put simply, the Applicant argues that because the Commissioner in this case was selected because of his skills as a judge, although he was sitting as a Commissioner in the hearings, he should be held to the same standard of judicial neutrality expected of a judge presiding over a trial.

72     Although the Commissioner's experience as a judge may have assisted him in his role as Commissioner, he was not sitting as a judge while performing his duties as a Commissioner. Thus, it does not necessarily follow that his impartiality is to be assessed using a strict application of the reasonable apprehension of bias test.

73     After considering the jurisprudence cited by the parties, I conclude that the Commission falls somewhere between the middle and high end of the Newfoundland Telephone spectrum. Thus, using a flexible application of the reasonable apprehension of bias test, I adopt the test enunciated by Justice de Grandpré in Committee for Justice and Liberty. That test is:

                    [T]he apprehension of bias must be a reasonable one, held by reasonable and right minded persons, applying themselves to the question and obtaining thereon the required information...[T]hat test is "what would an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically--and having thought the matter through--conclude. Would he think that it is more likely than not that Mr. Crowe [the Chairman of the Board], whether consciously or unconsciously, would not decide fairly": Committee for Justice and Liberty, supra, at p. 394.

74     As Justice Cory stated in R. v. S.(R.D.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 484 [hereinafter R.D.S.], the test for a reasonable apprehension of bias "contains a two-fold objective element: the person considering the alleged bias must be reasonable, and the apprehension of bias itself must also be reasonable in the circumstances of the case" (R.D.S. at para. 111). He further noted that "the reasonable person must be an informed person, with knowledge of all the relevant circumstances, including 'the traditions of integrity and impartiality that form a part of the background and apprised also of the fact that impartiality is one of the duties the judges swear to uphold'" (ibid.) [emphasis in original]. He added "the threshold for a finding of real or perceived bias is high" and "a real likelihood or probability of bias must be demonstrated...a mere suspicion is not enough" (R.D.S. at para. 112-113).

75     I harken back to the words of Lord Denning in Metropolitan Properties Co. (F.G.C.), Ltd.. v. Lannon, [1968] 3 All E.R. 304 (C.A.) at p. 310, 1 Q.B. 577 (C.A.) at p. 599, wherein he stated:

                    [I]n considering whether there was a real likelihood of bias, the court does not look at the mind of the justice himself or at the mind of the chairman of the tribunal, or whoever it may be, who sits in a judicial capacity. It does not look to see if there was a real likelihood that he would, or did, in fact favour one side at the expense of the other. The court looks at the impression which would be given to other people. Even if he was as impartial as could be, nevertheless, if right-minded persons would think that, in the circumstances, there was a real likelihood of bias on his part, then he should not sit. And if he does sit, his decision cannot stand [cited cases omitted]. Nevertheless, there must appear to be a real likelihood of bias. Surmise or conjecture is not enough [cited cases omitted]. There must be circumstances from which a reasonable man would think it likely or probable that the justice, or chairman, as the case may be, would, or did, favour one side unfairly. Suffice it that reasonable people might think he did. The reason is plain enough. Justice must be rooted in confidence: and confidence is destroyed when right-minded people go away thinking: "The judge was biased."

76     There exists a presumption that a decision-maker will act impartially, and "[m]ore than a mere suspicion, or the reservations of a 'very sensitive or scrupulous conscience,' is required to displace that presumption" (Beno (FCA), supra, at para. 29). The onus of demonstrating bias lies with the person who is alleging its existence and the threshold for finding a reasonable apprehension of bias is high. But, where a reasonable apprehension of bias is found, the hearing and any decision resulting from it will be void, since the damage created by such an apprehension of bias cannot be remedied. This is consistent with Justice Le Dain's decision, speaking for the Court in Cardinal v. Director of Kent Institution, supra, at p. 661, wherein he stated:

                    [...] I find it necessary to affirm that the denial of a right to a fair hearing must always render a decision invalid, whether or not it may appear to a reviewing court that the hearing would likely have resulted in a different decision. The right to a fair hearing must be regarded as an independent, unqualified right which finds its essential justification in the sense of procedural justice which any person affected by an administrative decision is entitled to have. It is not for a court to deny that right and sense of justice on the basis of speculation as to what the result might have been had there been a hearing.

97     The Attorney General relies heavily on these assurances by the Commissioner in support of the argument that the Commissioner had not formed premature conclusions. That the Commissioner made assurances that he had not prejudged any issue is irrelevant, as one may be unaware of their own biases. In R v. Gough, [1993] A.C. 646 (H.L.) at p. 655 (quoted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 259), Lord Goff, quoting Devlin L.J. in The Queen v. Barnsley Licensing Justices, [1960] 2 Q.B. 167 (C.A.), stated:

                    Bias is or may be an unconscious thing and a man may honestly say that he was not actually biased and did not allow his interest to affect his mind, although nevertheless, he may have allowed it unconsciously to do so. The matter must be determined upon the probabilities to be inferred from the circumstances in which the justices sit.

98     The determinative test, as stated above, is whether a reasonably well-informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically, would conclude that there is a reasonable apprehension of bias. As I have already stated, I am satisfied that the test for a reasonable apprehension of bias has been met in this case.

99     Lastly, I note that Commissioner made other inappropriate comments that seemingly tainted the purpose and focus of the Inquiry. On a number of occasions, the Commissioner referred to the proceedings as a "show" or "spectacle" and even declared: "I have the best seat in the house for the best show in town." Upon his retirement, the Commissioner further commented: "I was criticized for saying it but I stand by what I said -- I had the best seat in the house for the best show in town." "It was an amazing spectacle. It was a drama with surprise discoveries almost every day, with eminently competent lawyers. It was an ideal situation for the person running the show." "It wasn't a rehearsed spectacle, but to see witnesses, one after the other, making startling revelations after being confronted with documents they couldn't explain was exciting and engrossing." Although these statements do not indicate a reasonable apprehension of bias toward the Applicant per se, they had the effect of transforming the nature of the inquiry from one that was a fact-finding mission with the hallmarks of fairness into an "exhibition" of misconduct on the part of senior government officials.

100     The Applicant has also raised concerns about the Commissioner's preoccupation with the media. He argues that Commissioner Gomery was seduced by the media and the limelight to such an extent that the judicial instinct for fairness, objectivity and restraint which the Applicant was entitled to expect of him gave way to a preoccupation on his part with focussing media (and public) attention upon himself, a course of conduct which preordained unfavourable findings about the Applicant in the Report.

101     I agree with the Applicant that the Commissioner became preoccupied with ensuring that the spotlight of the media remained on the Commission's inquiry, and he went to great lengths to ensure that the public's interest in the Commission did not wane. This preoccupation with the media outside the hearing room had a detrimental impact on the fairness of the proceedings.

102     I note that although the Commissioner, in his ruling on the Motion for Recusal, acknowledged that some of the statements he had made during the interviews were, in his words, "ill-advised" and "inappropriate." He further acknowledged that his statements detracted attention from "the real objective of the Inquiry, which [was] to get at the truth of the matters which were subject of Chapters 3 and 4 of the Report of the Auditor General" and expressed his regret for this distraction. However, this acknowledgement and expression of regret, in my view, were incapable of repairing the harm that the Commissioner caused to the Applicant's reputation and the irreparable harm caused to the fairness or apparent fairness of the proceedings.

103     Considering again the basic principles applicable to commissions of inquiries so succinctly set down by Justice Cory in Krever, above, I do not read that it is a function of a Commissioner to grant press interviews nor to express, during such an interview or interviews, an opinion as to what the evidence showed, and more particularly, to express that opinion before all of the evidence had been heard from the witnesses who were called to testify or were to be called to testify. Although I do not necessarily agree with the Applicant that the Commissioner's preoccupation with the media "preordained unfavourable findings about the Applicant in the Report," I find that the Commissioner's conduct outside the hearing room had a detrimental effect on the fairness of the proceedings in that the Applicant was put in a position in which he was caused to appear before a Commission that had publicly questioned his conduct and integrity before he had even appeared before the Commission.

104     The media is not an appropriate forum in which a decision-maker is to become engaged while presiding over a commission of inquiry, a trial, or any other type of hearing or proceeding. Indeed, the only appropriate forum in which a decision-maker is to become engaged is within the hearing room of the very proceeding over which he or she is presiding. Comments revealing impressions and conclusions related to the proceedings should not be made extraneous to the proceedings either prior, concurrently or even after the proceedings have concluded.

105     I stress that even in public inquiries where the purpose of the proceedings is to educate and inform the public, it is not the role of decision-makers to become active participants in the media. First and foremost, a decision-maker's primary duty is to remain impartial, with an open mind that is amenable to persuasion. It is only when all the evidence is heard and after deliberating on that evidence that a decision-maker is to form conclusions and, finally, to issue a judgment or report on the basis of these conclusions. It follows that a decision-maker speaks by way of his or her decision. This is the only appropriate forum in which a decision-maker should state his or her conclusions. As my colleague, mentor and friend, the late Justice Frank Collier once said to me when I was first appointed as a judge, "Let the decision speak for itself."

106     I am convinced that an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically and having thought the matter through would find that the Commissioner's statements to the media during the Phase I hearings, after the release of the Report and upon his retirement, viewed cumulatively, indicate that the Commissioner prejudged issues under investigation and that he was not impartial toward the Applicant. The nature of the comments made to the media are such that no reasonable person, looking realistically and practically at the issue, and thinking the matter through, could possibly conclude that the Commissioner would decide the issues fairly.

107     I do note, however, that with respect to the other statements raised by the Applicant in support of his argument on this point and which I have not dealt with directly in my reasons, I do not find these remarks establish a reasonable apprehension of bias. For example, Commissioner Gomery's comments that his findings could prove "very harmful" to then Prime Minister Paul Martin's career and that the Report "might have more consequences for a minority government than for a majority government" are simply indicative of Commissioner Gomery's awareness of the public interest in the inquiry and the possible ramifications the Report could have in the political sphere. Such awareness does not amount to a reasonable apprehension of bias in my view.

108     Given that I have already found a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the Commissioner toward the Applicant, I need not address the remaining issues in this application. At the hearing, the parties made submissions regarding the effect of a finding of a reasonable apprehension of bias on the Commissioner's Report if one were to be found. I conclude that, as a result of my finding that there existed a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the Commissioner toward the Applicant, the findings in the Report, as they relate to the Applicant, must be set aside. This is consistent with the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Newfoundland Telephone, supra, wherein Justice Cory, writing for the Court, held that where a reasonable apprehension of bias is found to exist on the part of a tribunal, its decision must be treated as void.

Resources

Walter Rodney COI, June 26, 2014 - Part 1, Stabroek News, June 26, 2014

Walter Rodney COI, June 26, 2014 - Part 2, Stabroek News, June 26, 2014

Walter Rodney COI, June 26, 2014 - Part 3, Stabroek News, June 26, 2014

Walter Rodney COI, June 26, 2014 - Part 4, Stabroek News, June 26, 2014

Capitol News, June 26, 2014

GINA, June 26, 2014

Demerara Waves, Rodney Inquiry: Gerry Gouveia believes he transported Gregory Smith to Kwakwani, June 26, 2014

Gouveia flew plane that spirited Smith away — Guyana Times, June 26, 2014


Kaieteurnewsonline, Chairman has shown his bias – Harmon, June 27, 2014


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Selwyn A. Pieters, B.A. (Toronto), LL.B. (Osgoode), L.E.C. (U.W.I). Lawyer & Notary Public (Ontario). Attorney-at-Law (Republic of Guyana and Republic of Trinidad and Tobago).

Selwyn has appeared at all levels of courts, including the Supreme Court of Canada in Attorney General of Ontario v. Michael J. Fraser, et al., 2011 SCC 20, Ontario Court of Appeal in Freeman-Maloy v. Marsden 267 D.L.R. (4th) 37, 208 O.A.C. 307 (C.A.); Bangoura v. Washington Post (2005) 202 O.A.C. 76, (2005) 17 C.P.C. (6th) 30 (Ont.C.A.), the Federal Court of Appeal in The Honourable Sinclair Stevens v. The Conservative Party of Canada, [2005] F.C.J. No. 1890, 2005 FCA 383. He represented Correctional Manager Mariann Taylor-Baptiste in the ground-breaking competing rights case of Taylor-Baptiste v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union, 2012 CarswellOnt 8965, 2012 HRTO 1393, 2012 C.L.L.C. 230-022 reconsideration denied in 2013 CarswellOnt 1033, 2013 HRTO 180, 2013 C.L.L.C. 230-019 at the HRTO; Civil Rights lawyer Charles Roach in the Oath cases of McAteer, Topey, Dror-Natan v. Canada (Attorney General) 2013 CarswellOnt 13165, 2013 ONSC 5895 (ON S.C.) and Roach et al. v. Canada 2012 CarswellOnt 7799, 2012 ONSC 352 (ON S.C.) which is a constitutional challenge to the oath in the Citizenship Act.

Selwyn has provided representation to persons charged with various criminal offenses including Drugs: Selling and Possessing, Shoplifting, Serious Offences of Violence: Aggravated Assault, Assault with a Weapon and Robbery, Gun Offences, sexual assault, robbery, theft, extortion, HIV/AIDS litigation; fraud, break & enter, attempted murder, murder, regulatory offences under the Occupational Health and Safety Act, professional disciplinary offences, and conspiracy offences.

Selwyn has also been involved in drugs, guns and gang trials including "Project Green Apple", "Project XXX" and "Project Kryptic", "Project Corral" which are some of Canada's largest Criminal Organization prosecutions. Selwyn is currently counsel for an accused in "Project Feline" and Project Revival" drug sting operations. In Project Corral, Selwyn's advocacy resulted in the "gang expert" evidence being discredited and the Criminal Organization charges against his client and others being tossed out by the Court: R. v. Agil, Chambers, Fullerton, Jimale and Brown 2011 CarswellOnt 18099 (Ont. CJ. July 14, 2011, Khawley J.)

Selwyn recently obtained an extraordinary remedy of costs agains the Crown for failure to provide disclosure of police officer memo book notes in R. v. W.(J.), [2013] O.J. No. 2284, 2013 CarswellOnt 6322, 2013 ONCJ 270 (Ont. CJ.).

Selwyn is the successful litigant in the recent racial profiling case involving carding of three Black men: Peel Law Association v. Pieters, 2013 CarswellOnt 7881, 2013 ONCA 396, 228 A.C.W.S. (3d) 204, 116 O.R. (3d) 81, 306 O.A.C. 314, 9 C.C.E.L. (4th) 233, [2013] O.J. No. 2695.

Selwyn has provided crucial legal advise to clients duringhigh risk situations such as gun calls, hostage taking, barricaded persons, mentally disturbed persons, high risk arrests and public order control in situations where there is significant public disorder, lawlessness, personal injury and property damage. Charges of cause disturbance and assault police can be pretextual racial profiling charges: R. v. Roach, 2005 O.J. No. 5278 (Ont. C.J.) (Criminal Law - Causing a Disturbance); R. v. Ramsaroop, 2009 CarswellOnt 5281, 2009 ONCJ 406 (Ont. CJ.); R. v. Taylor, 2010 CarswellOnt 6584, 2010 ONCJ 396, [2010] O.J. No. 3794 (Ont. CJ.)

Selwyn was co-counsel in the world's first-ever sexual HIV transmission murder trial of Johnson Aziga in Hamilton, Ontario. See, for example, R. v. Aziga, 2008 CanLII 39222 (ON S.C.); R. v. Aziga; 2008 CarswellOnt 4300 (ON S.C.) and R. v. Aziga, 2008 CanLII 29780 (ON S.C.)

Selwyn argued on racial profiling includes: R. v. Steele, 2010 ONSC 233 (ON S.C.) and R. v. Egonu, 2007 CanLII 30475 (ON SC) - Driving while black and R. v. Bramwell-Cole [2010] O.J. No. 5838 (ON S.C.) - walking while black.

Selwyn has acted in exclusion cases at the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada: See, Song Dae Ri (Re) 2003 CarswellNat 4527; (2004) 36 Imm. L.R. (3d) 203; Liang (Re) 2002 CarswellNat 4719; 33 Imm. L.R. (3d) 251.

Selwyn has appeared in  Coroners' Inquest including: Coroner's Inquest into the Death of Negus Topey (May 02, 2005, Coroners' Court, Dr. K.A. Acheson) Ruling on Application for Standing; Coroner's Inquest into the Death of Dwight Haughton (Coroners' Court, Dr. Evans) Ruling on Application for Standing; Coroner's Inquest into the Death of Jeffrey Reodica(May 04, 2006, Coroners' Court, Dr. B. Porter) Ruling on Application for Standing

Selwyn also acted as co-counsel with C. Nigel Hughes for the families of three deceased persons killed during a civil demonstration in Linden, Guyana, at the Linden Commission of Inquiry. Selwyn is currently co-counsel with Brian M. Clarke representing the Guyana Trades Union Congress in the Walter Anthony Rodney Commission of Inquiry in Georgetown, Guyana.